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This article reviews the academic literature on monitoring in private equity. Monitoring in private equity funds encompasses oversight or governance over the fund’s general partner (GP, who manages the fund) for the benefit of the fund’s limited partners (LPs, who invest in the fund). The potential need for monitoring arises from the principal-agent relation between the GP and LPs. In contrast, most prior literature on governance in the private equity setting focuses on the GP’s governance over its investments, known as portfolio companies. The article first describes the private equity fund setting, highlighting that potential monitors likely have relatively less influence over private equity funds than over public firms. Building on the description of the unique private equity fund setting, the article discusses typical monitors of public firms that are unlikely to monitor private equity funds. The article then discusses the...
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Easton, P., Larocque, S., Mason, P., Utke, S. (2023). Monitoring in Private Equity. In: Cumming, D., Hammer, B. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Private Equity. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38738-9_116-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38738-9_116-1
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