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Introduction

Jurisprudence focuses on theories of and about law, asking questions such as: What constitutes a legal norm? How is a valid legal norm identified? What makes a good legal norm?

In the pursuit to explain the nature of legal norms, jurisprudence has at its disposal two mother theories: legal positivism and natural-law legal theory. Natural-law claims that we can make sense of valid legal norms as reasons for action, i.e., reasons for doing what the norm demands, if such norms are derived from reason and concurrent with principles of justice and rule of law. As such, there are conditions of merit on whether a legal norm is valid. Legal positivism holds that valid legal norms are simply matters of social fact. For legal positivism, legal norms provide reasons for action distinct from moral reasons. This is because legal norms are backed not simply by reason but by legal institutions and their prescribed legal procedures.

The three main tenants of legal positivism are: the...

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Correspondence to Kara Woodbury-Smith .

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Woodbury-Smith, K. (2018). Inclusive Legal Positivism. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_62-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_62-2

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Legal Positivism: Inclusive
    Published:
    24 November 2022

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_62-3

  2. Original

    Inclusive Legal Positivism
    Published:
    25 June 2018

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_62-2